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In this paper we ﬁnd empirical evidence of bank lending channel for Colom-
bia.and Argentina. As for Argentina, we do not ﬁnd evidence that changes in
the interbank interest rate aﬀect the growth rate of t otal loans directly. How-
ever, it does indirectly through interactions: the interbank interest rate aﬀects
the loan supply through its interactions with capitalization and liquidity.As for
Colombia, there is direct bank lending channel, which is reinforced through
interactions with capitalization and liquidity. Also, using a panel data of more
than 3300 ﬁrms, we provide additional support to the existence of a bank lend-
ing channel for Colombia.
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1 Introduction
While economists agree that monetary policy can aﬀect real output in the short run,
there is still a lot of controversy on how does monetary policy exactly operate.
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1The most commonly discussed channel, the traditional "interest rate" channel,
suggests that when the Fed decreases money supply (exchanging bonds for bank re-
serves), nominal and real interest rates will increase -the eﬀect of monetary policy on
the real interest rates works through an assumption of sticky prices in the short run.
Consequently, investment and present consumption decrease, and therefore aggregate
demand (AD) decreases. However, as Bernanke and Gertler (1995) point out, empiri-
cal studies of the interest rate channel have not been entirely successfull in explaining
large changes in GDP and AD components due to moderate changes in the interest
rates induced by monetary policy. This empirical ﬁndings have led to a vast literature
that tries to identify and quantify other monetary transmission mechanisms, which
complement and amplify the interest rate channel.
A longstanding question is whether ﬁnancial institutions in general, and banks in
particular, play an important role in the transmission of monetary policy to the real
economy. The literature identiﬁes two channels in which ﬁnancial institutions might
play a signiﬁcant role, namely, the balance sheet channel (or broad credit channel)
and the bank lending channel (or narrow credit channel).
The balance sheet channel was ﬁrst introduced by Bernanke and Gertler (1989).
The main idea of this mechanism is that in the presence of imperfect capital markets,
informational asymmetries between borrowers and lenders cause a gap in the cost
of internal and external sources of funding to borrowers. In general, this gap has
a negative relation with the collateral of the borrower. A contractionary monetary
policy has the eﬀect of increasing real interest rates, therefore reducing the value of
assets that act as collateral, that has the eﬀect of deteriorating credit worthiness of
borrowers. Therefore, consumption and investment plans that would be proﬁtable
if ﬁnanced entirely with internal sources of funding, are no longer proﬁtable when
ﬁnanced partially with external sources. This eﬀect leads to a lower level of AD in
the economy, magnifying the eﬀects of the interest rate channel. Note that there is
no speciﬁc role played by banks in the broad credit channel.
On the other hand, the bank lending channel gives a speciﬁcr o l et ob a n k s .T h e
basic idea is that a contractionary monetary policy that reduces bank deposits creates
a need for alternative funds in order to maintain the level of loans. If such alternative
funds are scarce or not available, then banks will necessarily reduce their loan supply,
aﬀecting negatively consumption and investment plans. Therefore, the bank lending
channel ampliﬁes the eﬀect on AD of a contractionary monetary policy.
In order to have a bank lending channel two conditions are required: ﬁrst, some
ﬁrms must be dependent on bank loans; second, the central bank must be able to
shift bank loan supply schedules. Regarding the ﬁrst condition, there is evidence that
suggests that small ﬁrms are bank dependent1.T h i so c c u r sb e c a u s eb a n k sh a v ec o m -
parative advantage in the sense of having lower costs of obtaining information about
(and monitoring) their customers than other investors. Also, small ﬁrms generally
lack access to securities markets and this eﬀect will be more important for countries
1For US, see for example Fazzari et al (1988).
2with less developed capital markets.
With respect to the second condition, a contractionary monetary policy has the
eﬀect of reducing the aggregate level of deposits 2. S i n c et h e s ea r eo n eo ft h el e a s t
expensive sources of ﬁnancing for banks, it will be costly (for some banks) and even
impossible (for others)3 to oﬀset the shortage in deposits with other sources of funding.
In particular, if the Modigliani-Miller ﬁnancial irrelevance theorem (Modigliani and
Miller (1958) does not hold for the banking ﬁr m ,s o m eb a n k sw i l ln o tb ea b l et o
obtain loanable funds required to maintain their level of lending, and therefore their
loan supply will drop4. Then, ﬁnancial variables that measure banks’ ﬁnancial health
can play an important role, in the sense that banks with weak balance sheets are more
aﬀected by informational asymmetries than banks with stronger balance sheets.
In this paper, we present evidence that supports the existence of a lending channel
of monetary policy for Argentina and Colombia.
Since capital markets are underdeveloped in these two countries, banks are a key
source of ﬁnancing for ﬁrms and households. Consequently, one would expect that
the bank lending is stronger in these two economies (vis-a-vis countries with well
developed capital markets).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical
model developed by Kishan and Opiela (2000), that has testable implications for the
empirical analysis. Section 3 discusses the data and summary statistics. Section 4
presents the empirical analysis and results, and Section 5 concludes.
2A M o t i v a t i n g M o d e l
Kishan and Opiela (2000) provide evidence of the existence of a bank lending channel
of monetary policy in the US from 1980 to 1995. Following Kashyap and Stein (1995),
they try to identify the bank lending channel by studying cross sectional diﬀerences
2Bernanke and Blinder (1992) show that aggregate deposit fall immediately when the Fed tight-
ens. Using bank dissagregated data, Kashyap and Stein (1995) also provide evidence that supports
this.
3Because demand deposits are insured, they are less subject to informational asymmetries relative
to other sources of funding (i.e. large time deposits). Meanwhile, other sources of funding for
banks are uninsured, what makes them more likely to suﬀer information problems. Therefore, bank
characteristics that are not so important for the obtention of deposits become very relevant for the
acquisition of other sources of funds, such as large CDs.
4Another way in which a contractionary monetary policy can aﬀect bank lending is through
its impact on the capitalization ratio. Banks face interest rate risk given their role in maturity
transformation: they hold long term assets (many of them with a ﬁxed interest rate), which they
ﬁnance issuing short term liabilities. Therefore, a contractionary monetary policy, that increses
short-term interest rates, increases the debt of the banks and decreases the net present value of its
assets, thus reducing bank proﬁts. If banks cannot reduce dividend payments substantially, then
equity is reduced. Given the minimum capitalization requirements , some banks that initially had
a low capitalization ratio, will have to cut lending to meet the capitalization requirement as a short
term response.
3on the response of bank lending to monetary policy. To do so, they develop a model
of a representative bank that has three assets, namely required reserves (RR), loans
(LN) and securities (SEC); and three liabilities, namely, demand deposits (DD),
large time deposits (TD) and capital (K). For simplicity, the bank does not hold
excess reserves, so RR = αDD,w h e r eα ∈ [0,1] is determined by the central bank.
DD are assumed to be inversely related to the Fed funds rate: DD = a0 −a1rff.
A bank is assumed to have market power in the TD market as well as in the LN
market. Thus, it can raise TD by increasing its rate (rTD) o v e rt h em e a nr a t ei nt h e
market (rTD), and can change loans by moving its loan rate (rLN)w i t hr e s p e c tt o
t h em e a nr a t ei nt h el o a nm a r k e t( rLN):
TD = b0 + b1(rTD− rTD)
LN = d0 − d1(rLN − rLN)
Capital markets are assumed to be imperfect. This is introduced by assuming that
t h ei n t e r e s tr a t es e n s i t i v i t i e so fTD and LN respectively((b1,d 1) >> 0), depend on
bank size and capitalization. Speciﬁcally, it is assumed that b1 depends positively on
both bank size and capitalization, following the idea that larger and better capitalized
banks will ﬁnd it easier to raise funds by issuing time deposits. Meanwhile, d1 depends
positively on bank size only, reﬂecting the idea that larger banks tend to give credit to
larger ﬁrms which have better access to alternative sources of funding. Thus, larger
banks have a demand for LN which is more sensible to changes in the interest rate









Securities are held as a buﬀer stock against liquidity shocks, and the mean market
rates of TD,SEC and LN are assumed to be directly related to the Fed funds rate
with ﬁxed spreads:
SEC = c0 + c1DD − RR
rTD = e0 + φrff
rSEC = f0 + φrff
rLN = g0 + φrff
Banks are assumed to choose LN,TD and SEC to maximize proﬁts,
Profit=( rLN − Φ)LN + rSECSEC − rTDDD − rLNTD
4subject to the balance sheet constraint (LN +SEC+RR = DD+TD+K)a n d
the equations given above. ΦLN represents loan losses.
The ﬁrst order conditions of this maximization problem yield the optimal portfolio
for the bank (ie, LN, SEC, TD). Taking derivatives of LN, SEC and TD with
respect to the Fed funds rate generates some testable implications. In particular,
assuming c1 < 1, the model predicts that an increase in this rate should increase TD,
decrease LN, and have an ambiguous eﬀect on SEC (the sign of the partial derivative















= −a1(c1 − α) S 0
More interesting testable implications, however, derive from the introduction of
the assumption mentioned before, of the dependence of interest rate sensitivities of


























(b1 + d1)2 > 0
1)The net eﬀect of asset size on the sensitivity of LN to rff is undetermined and
depends on parameter values. This reﬂects the idea that two factors play an important
role for big banks: maybe they are less subject to asymmetries of information than
smaller banks, and therefore they can obtain easier alternative sources of funds (TD)
when a contractionary monetary policy reduces DD; but, their clients are also bigger
ﬁrms which tend to be more sensitive to interest rates, so if big banks increase rLN
due to higher costs of funding, they will loose more demand for loans than smaller
banks. Similarly, it is unclear the eﬀect of bank size on the sensitivity of TD to the
Fed funds rate.
2)The sensitivity of LN to rff is lower for better capitalized banks; that is, better
capitalized banks experience a lower reduction in loans that less well capitalized banks
do. Similarly, better capitalized banks will increase more TD in times of monetary
policy tightening.
Thus, capitalization and bank size appear to matter for lending. In Section 4 we
test the predictions for bank lending that derive from this model for Argentina and
Colombia.
53D a t a
3.1 Data sources
The data for banks of Argentina are taken from the Información de Entidades Fi-
nancieras releases of the Central Bank of Argentina, which consists of the monthly
balance sheets that each bank is required to report to the Superintendencia de En-
tidades Financieras y Cambiarias (the ﬁnancial institutions’ regulator). The period
used is November 1995 to November 2005. Unfortunately, such releases only include
those banks that existed as of November 2005; therefore, banks that dissapeared
throughout the period are not included in the dataset.
The data for banks of Colombia comes from ﬁnancial statements that banks re-
port monthly to the Superintendencia Financiera de Colombia, which regulates the
ﬁnancial system. The sample used covers the period 1995:1 to 2005:9, and consists
of all the commercial banks that were operating at every moment of time. The panel
of banks is unbalanced, with a maximum number of 40 banks in 1997:12, and a min-
imum of 21 banks at the ﬁnal period. The number of banks at the beginning of the
sample period was 38. The reduction in the number of banks during the last ten
years reﬂects the consequences of the period of stress experienced by ﬁnancial insti-
tutions in Colombia between 1997 and 1999, that led to bank failures, acquisitions
and merges among ﬁnancial institutions5.
The macroeconomic variables used were taken from several sources: International
Financial Statistics data was used for CPI and bilateral exchange rate peso-US dollar
for both countries. As a proxy of GDP, which is not available on a monthly basis,
the Estimador Mensual de Actividad Económica index (EMAE) without seasonality
was used for Argentina, and the Indice de Producción Real Manufacturera (IPM) for
Colombia. The ﬁrst one is available online in a monthly frequency from Instituto
Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos of Argentina (INDEC), while the second one is
available online at the Central Bank of Colombia’s (BANREP) web page.
The interbank interest rate is used as the monetary policy instrument. This
variable was chosen, because it is the most commonly used in monetary transmission
mechanism and inﬂation targeting studies (see, for example, Gomez and Julio (2001)).
The interbank interest rate of Argentina is available online at the webpage of the
Central Bank of Argentina (BCRA), and that of Colombia is available online at the
webpage of BANREP.
5The way in which the Superintendencia Financiera handles acquisitions and merges is the fol-
lowing: ﬁrst, when a big bank acquires a small bank (deﬁnition), the small bank disappears while
the big bank’s ﬁgures become those of the group; second, when a merge takes place, both banks
disappear at the time of the merge, and a new one starts operating the period after.
63.2 Construction of variables
As a proxy of bank-speciﬁc characteristics, capitalization ratio, liquidity and size
were used. The ratio of equity over assets was used as the measure of capitalization.
Liquidity was measured as the ratio between liquid assets minus short-term liabilities
and deposits (checking, savings and time deposits). Size of bank i is deﬁned as the
ratio of its total asset to the total asset of the banking system at a particular point
in time.
These variables are included to test whether bank speciﬁcv a r i a b l e sa ﬀect lend-
ing, and whether banks with diﬀerent characteristics respond diﬀerently to monetary
policy shocks. According to the bank lending channel, capital market imperfections
aﬀect the relationship between banks and their investors. Therefore, it is expected
that variables that proxy for the ﬁnancial health of a bank, such as capitalization
and liquidity, matter in these relationships. It is not so clear if size should matter, at
least there is not a precise economic reason of why it should matter6, but given that
it is a variable widely used in this literature, it is included here as well.
3.3 Characteristics of the banking sectors in Argentina and
Colombia
T a b l e s1t o4s h o ws u m m a r ys t a t i s t i c so fc h a r acteristics of the banking systems (com-
mercial banks) in Argentina and Colombia at two diﬀerent points in time. These
characteristics are presented in two ways: the ﬁrst four columns in each table group
banks according to asset size, while the last four group them according to the capital-
ization ratio. For instance, the fourth column, ">75", stands for the group composed
by the 25 percent of banks with the highest size in terms of assets. Similarly, the
eighth column, also labeled ">75", stands for the group composed by the 25 percent
banks with highest capitalization ratio.
According to Table 1, that shows the characteristics of the banking system in
Argentina in November 2005, the relationship between size and capitalization is neg-
ative, while that of size and liquidity is positive; bigger banks in terms of asset size
have lower capitalization ratios and are more liquid. This can also be observed when
banks are grouped according to their capitalization ratio: banks that are more capi-
talized have signiﬁcantly lower liquidity ratios. This can be explained by the fact that
holding liquid assets has an opportunity cost which better capitalized banks need not
incur.
I ti sa l s oi m p o r t a n tt on o t et h a tt h e r ea r eb i gd i ﬀerences in the ratios of capital-
ization among groups of banks in Argentina. For instance, for November 2005, while
the 25 percent less capitalized banks had a capital ratio of 5.6%, the top 25 percent
6If ﬁnancial indicators of banks were not publicly available, it could be the case that bank
investors used size as a proxy of ﬁnancial health. Nevertheless, in most countries this information
is publicly available. And, in particular, that is the case of Colombia, and Argentina.
7had a capital ratio of almost 55%. This diﬀerences are much stronger than those of
banks in the US and other countries as Colombia.
It can also be observed that the group of more capitalized banks has a signiﬁcantly
lower ratio of deposits to liabilities. This can be explained by the fact that more
capitalized banks have better access to alternative sources of funding, and therefore
they depend less on deposits to ﬁnance their positions in assets. This same pattern
holds for December 1996, as shown in Table 2.
From Table 2 one can observe that in December 1996 bank characteristics were
slightly diﬀerent for Argentinean banks. First, although the smallest banks in terms of
assets were the most capitalized ones, the relationship between size and capitalization
is not as systematic as in Table 1 for the other three asset size groups. Second, the
relationship between asset size and liquidity is not at all clear. Third, although the
relationship between liquidity and capitalization is not as clear as appears to be in
T a b l e1 ,s t i l lt h eg r o u po ft h em o s tc a p i t a l i z e db a n k si s ,a tt h es a m et i m e ,t h eg r o u p
with a lowest liquidity ratio.
It is important to mention that, since the sample of banks in 1996 consists only of
surviving banks as of November 2005, there might be a selection bias towards higher
capitalization ratios for December 1996, specially for small banks in terms of assets,
given the characteristics of the data set for Argentina.
As for Colombia, some important facts can be observed from Table 3. When
looking at the diﬀerences according to size, it can be noticed that smaller banks
tend to have a bigger participation of loans in their assets, vis-a-vis larger banks.
Similarly, they have a smaller participation of securities. That trend explains the
fact that smaller banks appear to have lower liquidity ratios than larger banks do.
Similarly, the biggest banks have a high capitalization ratio, relative to the mean
of the system. Also important, the banks in the smallest percentile are the less
capitalized among commercial banks. Note also that banks of any size obtain their
ﬁnancing basically from deposits7.
Meanwhile, when looking at the characteristics of banks according to their cap-
italization ratio, trends seem to be less clear. The most capitalized banks (those
above the 75th percentile) are also the biggest ones, according to market shares.
But, for lower percentiles, there is no clear relationship between size, as proxied by
market shares, and the degree of capitalization. More importantly, when dividing
banks according to the capitalization ratio, there does not appear to be a pattern in
asset composition; the percentage of loans in the total assets are very similar among
groups, as well as the percentage of securities. But, what can be observed, is that the
most capitalized banks have a larger proportion of commercial loans and a smaller
participation of consumption loans.
Nevertheless, banks’ characteristics in Colombia appear to have changed over
time. Table 4 replicates the information shown in Table 3 for December 1997. One
interesting feature is that asset composition has varied quite importantly. By the
7Deposits include demand deposits as well as time deposits.
8end of 1997, there was a negative relation between capitalization and the ratio of
loans to assets; while banks in the ﬁrst quartile according to capitalization had a
ratio of loans to assets above 75%, the quartile of the most capitalized banks had
a ratio below 60%. Correspondingly, the ratio of securities to assets had a positive
relationship with the degree of capitalization. When comparing asset composition
between 1997 and 2005, it is noticeable that, in general, banks turned to have more
securities and less loans in their portfolios after the crisis. Note that the ratio of loans
to assets reduced importantly for all groups of banks, while the ratio of securities to
assets rose signiﬁcantly. This can probably be explained by the systematic default
of banks that took higher risks in the period of credit boom before the crisis, and
by more conservative lending policies taken by surviving banks that tend to account
better for risks derivating from the lending business.
Another important feature, now regarding liability composition, is that more cap-
italized banks in 1997 tended to have a lower ratio of deposits to total liabilities than
less capitalized banks. This seems to provide some indirect evidence of the presence
of capital market imperfections for banks, as predicted by the bank lending channel
theory, and also of the importance of the capitalization ratio as an indicator of the
degree of informational asymmetries faced by banks. Basically, the fact that there is
a negative relation between the degree of capitalization and the ratio of deposits to
liabilities supports the idea that better capitalized banks are less deposit-dependent,
in the sense that they can ﬁnd easier substitutes for these than less capitalized banks
do. Nevertheless, this relationship tended to disappear in time, becoming less clear
in recent years. Probably this happened because the diﬀerences in capitalization be-
tween diﬀerent groups of banks has reduced, due to failure of poorly capitalized banks
and also to ﬁnancial decisions taken by surviving banks.
As a ﬁnal point concerning the evolution of the banking sector characteristics in
time for Colombia, it is important to mention that more capitalized banks appear to
have a larger proportion of commercial loans in their portfolios. This could suggest
that banks that lend to large ﬁrms are healthier and better capitalized banks.
One can observe several diﬀerences for Argentina and Colombia from Tables 1
to 4. One is that the banking system of Argentina is much more concentrated than
that of Colombia. For example, while the largest banks in Argentina hold 86% of
the assets of the system, that ﬁgure is 51% for Colombia, even though the number
of commercial banks in Argentina is more than three times that of Colombia. Next,
the capitalization ratios for Argentina are much higher than those for Colombia,
especially in recent years. Also, banks in Argentina with the highest capitalization
ratios are small banks in terms of asset size, whereas in Colombia, those with the
highest capitalization ratios are big banks in terms of asset size. When looking at the
changes over time of banking sector characteristics, bank characteristics in Argentina
seemed to remain stable between 1996 and 2005, while important changes took place
for Coloimbia, probably as a consequence of diﬀerences in the way in which both
data sets are constructed; namely, that the data set for Argentina contains only
9those banks existing in November 2005, whereas for Colombia there is also data for
banks that dissappeared.
4 Empirical results:









2 ¯ Zit−1φj + αDummycrisist + uit ((1))
where yit represents the growth rate of total loans for bank i at time t; X is a matrix
of macroeconomic variables including a proxy for the growth rate of GDP, growth rate
of real exchange rate and the policy instrument, which is the real interbank interest
rate (denoted by x3it and calculated as the nominal interbank interest rate minus
observed monthly inﬂation rate). Z i sam a t r i xo fb a n ks p e c i ﬁc variables, namely,
capitalization and liquidity. Monthly dummies to control for seasonality in the data
were also included ; Dummycrisis is a dummy variable included for Colombia to
control for the ﬁnancial crisis period between July 1998 and December 2000; and, the
error term was assumed i.i.d. as well as to account for bank speciﬁc AR(1) structure.
For Colombia, another two regressions are considered, namely, one for commercial
loans and one for consumer loans.
The estimated empirical speciﬁcation for both countries is
⎛
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where 1,...,m are the banks and and the X∗ matrix contains all the variables in
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The variance structure of the errors was speciﬁed to account for autocorrelation
of order 1 speciﬁct oe a c hp a n e l8.
8Some studies have used dynamic panel data models to look for evidence of a bank lending
channel. However, since the endogenous variable is the growth rate of loans, it is not clear why the
10The results for Argentina suggest that there is no direct bank lending channel
triggered by changes in the interbank intererest rate. But there is indirect eefect on
bank lending through the interactions of the interbank interest rate and capitalization
and, to a less extent, liquidity.
Table 5: Total Eﬀect Coeﬃcients for Argentina
Dependent variable: Growth rate of Total Loans
Va ri a b le Coefficient Std.Err.
Interbank rate -0.032 0.022
Interactions:
Interbank rate x Liquidity 0.048** 0.015
Interbank rate x Capitalization 0.143* 0.025
*S i g n i ﬁcant at the 1 percent level **Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level
These results suggest that when the interbank interest rate changes, the growth
rate of loans will be aﬀected less the better capitalized (and the higher its liquidity
ratio) the bank is.
The results for Colombia agree with the basic ideas of the bank lending channel.
See Tables 6 and 7, which show the results of the regressions corresponding to total
loans and commercial loans. Note that the impact of monetary policy on the growth
rate of loans is negative; increments in the interbank interest rate lead to reductions
in the growth rate of loans. However, the impact is not the same accross banks; those
institutions that have lower capitalization and liquidity ratios are aﬀected more.
This suggests that these bank speciﬁc variables, capitalization and liquidity, af-
fect lending decisions done by banks, and also the ability that they have to obtain
alternative sources of funding when a monetary policy shock aﬀects the amount of
core deposits in the economy.
The results are quite diﬀerent when the growth rate of consumption loans in used
in the regressions. The interest rate is not signiﬁcant in explaining changes in the
growth rate of these loans, and bank speciﬁc variables do not appear to matter either.
This result suggests that consumer loans have a diﬀerent dynamics than commercial
loans. However, as it was seen before, commercial loans represent the great majority
of total loans, and that can explain that even when there is no evidence of a bank
lending channel for consumer loans, there is evidence for total loans.
growth rate of loans of today depending on its previous realizations. The current period growth
rate of loans might depend on past periods realizations through demand side inﬂuences, but these
should be captured by the macroeconomic and bank speciﬁcv a r i a b l e s .
11Table 6: Total Eﬀect Coeﬃcients for Colombia
Dependent variable: Growth rate of Total Loans
Va ri a b le Coefficient Std.Err.
Interbank rate -.6824* .0551
Interactions:
Interbank rate x Liquidity 1.6949* .1379
Interbank rate x Capitalization 4.5424* .3608
*S i ﬁi g n c a n ta tt h e1p e r c e n tl e v e l
Table 7: Total Eﬀect Coeﬃcients for Colombia
Dependent variable: Growth rate of Commercial Loans
Va ri a b le Coefficient Std.Err.
Interbank rate -.6710* .0757
Interactions:
Interbank rate x Liquidity 1.5629* .1892
Interbank rate x Capitalization 4.7544* .4947
*S i g n i ﬁcant at the 1 percent level
5 Bank Lending Channel for Colombia using Firms’
data
As a robustness test for the evidence of bank lending channel for Colombia, we analyze
balance sheet data for Colombian ﬁrms. In order to identify the bank lending channel
with these data, we separate ﬁrms into two groups according to the degree of leverage9.
Group 1 is composed by ﬁrms in the lowest quartile of leverage and Group 2 is
composed by ﬁrms in the highest quartile. The intuition behind this way of grouping
ﬁrms is that in moments of tight monetary policy, ﬁrms with higher indebtness will
ﬁnd it harder to obtain liquidity. Therefore, the impact of a change in interest rates
on these ﬁrms should be stronger than on those with lower leverage ratios.
Kashyap et al (1993) develops a simple theoretical model to model changes in
optimal debt structure of the ﬁrm over time. In times of contractionary monetary
policy, bank loans experience a supply shock due to the fall in deposits. As the spread
between the interest rates on bank loans and non-bank debt rises, the lending channel
would anticipate a decrease in bank lending.in the ﬁrms’ optimal debt structure.
Furthermore, as risk increases in periods of contractionary monetary policy, banks
will be more reluctant to lend to ﬁrms with poor information availability.
9Leverage is deﬁned as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets of the ﬁrm, following the
conventional deﬁnition.
125.1 Data Source
The data for ﬁrms was collected by the Supeintendencia de Sociedades, the organism
that regulates non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms in Colombia. The sample consists of a panel of an-
nual observations on ﬁrms from 1995 to 2004. For each year, more than six thousand
ﬁrms submit information about their balance sheets. The panel is unbalanced, due to
t h ee n t r ya n de x i to fﬁrms, and also to the fact that some ﬁr m sr e p o r tt h e i rb a l a n c e s
for some years but not for others (not necessarily for consecutive years).
After depurating the data base for ﬁrms that have an early exit or a late entry,
or that do not report for the whole span of time, we are left with a balanced panel of
around four thousand non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms belonging to various economic sectors.
5.2 Empirical Especiﬁcation and Results












where BDit represents the ratio of bank debt to total debt for ﬁrm i at time t; Rt is
the real interbank interest rate, which instruments for monetary policy; inv controls
for inventories and cap for capitalization. The parameters of interest are γ, θ,η and
µj; in particular, the vector θ, which multiplies the instrument for monetary policy.
Dummycrisis i sad u m m yv a r i a b l ei n c l u d e df o rC o l o m b i at oc o n t r o lf o rt h eﬁnancial
crisis period of 1999 and 2000. The error term is assumed i.i.d.
Because lag values of the dependent variable are included as regressors, we use
Arellano-Bond (1991) methodology, which corrects the inconsistency of the within
estimator and provides a consistent and eﬃcient estimator. The intuition of including
lags of the ratio of bank debt as covariates is that the ratio presents some inertia over
time, in the sense that the debt structure of ﬁrms does not change signiﬁcantly in
short periods of time.
The main results are summarized in Table 8, which presents the long run coeﬃ-
cients of the real interest rate for both groups of ﬁrms.
13Table 8: Evidence of Bank Lending Channel for Firms
Dependent variable: Ratio of Bank Debt to Total Debt
G r o u p1 :L o wL e v e r a g e dF i r m s
Va ri a b le Coefficient Std.Err.
Interbank rate -0.0068** 0.0037
**Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level
Group 2: High Leveraged Firms
Va ri a b le Coefficient Std.Err.
Interbank rate -0.0191* 0.0068
*S i g n i ﬁcant at the 1 percent level
As shown in Table 8, the ratio of bank debt to total debt of both groups of ﬁrms
goes down when the real interest rate increases. This is due to both supply and
demand factors and debt substitution. However, the impact is clearly bigger and
more signiﬁcant for high leveraged ﬁrms than for low leveraged ﬁrms. This provides
some additional support for the existence of a bank lending channel of monetary
policy in Colombia.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we ﬁnd empirical evidence of bank lending channel for Colombia. As
for Argentina, we do not ﬁnd evidence that changes in the interbank interest rate
aﬀect the growth rate of total loans directly. However, it does indirectly through
interactions: the interbank interest rate aﬀects the loan supply through its interac-
tions with capitalization and liquidity.As for Colombia, there is direct bank lending
channel, which is reinforced through interactions with capitalization and liquidity.
Bank speciﬁc variables are key in analyzing how changes in the interbank rate af-
fect the growth rate of loans for Argentina and Colombia. It is particularly important
the way in which capitalization aﬀects the lending ability of banks; better capitalized
banks should be able to lend more in moments of constrained liquidity. This might
b et h er e s u l to fac o m b i n a t i o no fm i n i m u mc a p i tal regulations and informational fric-
tions in markets for banks’ funds, which aﬀect both the decisions taken by banks and
their ability to raise funds in markets alternative to the deposits one.
Finally, using a panel data of more than 3300 ﬁrms, we provide additional support
to the existence of a bank lending channel for Colombia.
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15Table 1.  Characteristics of the Banking System in Argentina (November 2005) 
 
  By Asset Size (percentile)  By Capitalization (percentile) 
Characteristic  <  25  25-50  50-75  > 75  <  25  25-50  50-75  > 75 
Market Share (percent)   
Total  Assets  0.65  3.44  9.60 86.31  28.15 54.33 15.74  1.78 
Total  Loans  0.74  3.14  8.44 87.68  24.34 58.91 14.60  2.15   
Securities  0.51  2.80 10.15 86.53  33.69 51.71 12.98  1.62 
Deposits  0.21  3.16  9.20 87.44  24.08 64.03 11.36  0.52 
 
Ratios  as  group  aggregate  (percent)            
Loans  to  Asset  41.16 33.15 31.88 36.86  31.36 39.34 33.66 43.89   
Securities  to  Assets  23.29 24.06 31.18 29.58  35.30 28.08 24.33 26.91   
Deposits  to  Liabilities  38.38 70.44 72.37 69.34  55.52 80.61 57.33 42.89   
Capitalization  49.25 16.17 14.36 10.79  5.59 11.26 18.45 54.88   
Liquidity  11.80 17.70 26.60 28.47  32.99 24.72 30.57 11.53 
        
In millions of pesos of Nov 2005 
Total Assets of the system  208159 
Total Loans of the system  75522 
Total Securities of the system  61406 
Total Deposits of the system  133317 
 
In millions of US dollar of Nov 2005 
Total Assets of the system  70658 
Total Loans of the system  25636 
Total Securities of the system  20844   
Total Deposits of the system  45254 
 
Number  of Banks         72 Table 2.  Characteristics of the Banking System in Argentina (December 1996) 
 
  By Asset Size (percentile)  By Capitalization (percentile) 
Characteristic  <  25  25-50  50-75  > 75  <  25  25-50  50-75  > 75 
Market Share (percent)   
Total  Assets  1.17  3.72  9.83 85.27  17.91 33.69 39.49  8.92 
Total  Loans  0.80  3.19  7.83 88.18  15.57 33.86 39.47 11.11   
Securities  1.53  5.41 14.45 78.61  25.92 24.28 42.40  7.40 
Deposits  1.04  3.47  6.49 88.99  17.37 35.12 45.65  1.86 
 
Ratios  as  group  aggregate  (percent)            
Loans  to  Asset  40.26 50.21 46.73 60.66  50.99 58.95 58.63 73.11   
Securities  to  Assets  14.42 16.06 16.23 10.18  15.98  7.96 11.85  9.16   
Deposits  to  Liabilities  60.94 56.61 40.42 61.91  53.63 59.72 66.51 23.83   
Capitalization  25.68 14.06 16.47 14.66  6.51 10.04 14.72 51.43   
Liquidity  9.97 15.14  7.10  8.45  32.99 24.73 30.57 11.53 
        
In millions of pesos of Nov 2005 (constrained) 
Total Assets of the system  125631 
Total Loans of the system  73697 
Total Securities of the system  13872 
Total Deposits of the system  64729 
 
In millions of US dollar of Nov 2005 (constrained) 
Total Assets of the system  93829 
Total Loans of the system  55041 
Total Securities of the system  10360   
Total Deposits of the system  48343 
 
Number  of Banks (constrained)        58 Table 3.  Characteristics of the Banking System in Colombia (September 2005) 
 
  By Size (percentile)  By Capitalization (percentile) 
 
Characteristic  <25 25-50 50-75  >75  <25 25-50 50-75  >75 
Market  Share  (percent)          
Total  Assets  7.9    15.4 25.8 50.9 23.1 19.8    10.7 46.4       
Total  Loans  9.5 17.6 24.3 48.7    22.4 19.9 12.3 45.4       
Securities  5.9 11.7 29.5 52.9    24.2 19.9  8.0 47.9         
Deposits  7.5 15.9 26.7 49.9 23.1 20.4 11.0 45.5         
 
Ratios (percent) 
Loans  to  Assets  62.6 59.2 49.0 49.8 50.4 52.3 59.9 50.9     
Securities  to  Assets  25.3 25.6 38.7 35.2 35.5 34.0 25.3 34.9 
Deposits  to  Liabilities  75.8 85.9 84.6 81.4 79.0 84.2 84.5 83.1 
Liquidity  15.9 24.8 41.4 37.8 36.2 36.1 24.1 36.8 
Capitalization  8.8  12.7 10.8 12.1 7.9  10.7 11.9 13.8 
 
Participation of Total Loans (percent) 
Commercial  52.4 51.1 60.5 70.7 56.5 57.8 52.4 71.5 
Consumer  46.8 25.6 30.6 17.5 27.6 33.8 26.6 19.1 
Mortgage  0.4 24.3  8.7 10.0  9.6 9.4 22.1  10.0 
 
In millions of Colombian pesos of Nov 2005         In millions of US dollars of Nov 2005 
Total Assets of the system  110,231,651        Total Assets of the system    47,690 
Total Loans of the system  57,357,481        Total Loans of the system    24,815 
Total Securities of the system  37,273,492    Total  Securities of the system   16,126 
Total Deposits of the system  80,323,813        Total Deposits of the system    34,721 
 
Total Number of Commercial Banks  21 Table 4.  Characteristics of the Banking System in Colombia (December 1996) 
 
  By Size (percentile)  By Capitalization (percentile) 
 
Characteristic  <25 25-50 50-75  >75  <25 25-50 50-75  >75 
Market  Share  (percent)          
Total  Assets  4.6    11.8 28.8 54.8 31.8 15.5    25.2 27.4       
Total  Loans  4.7 11.2 29.6 54.5    36.8 16.5 22.7 24.0       
Securities  4.2 12.1 25.7 58.0    15.3 11.1 29.6 44.0           
Deposits  4.0 11.6 31.1 53.3    38.7 16.8 22.8 21.8         
 
Ratios (percent) 
Loans  to  Assets  66.4 62.2 67.4 65.2 75.7 69.8 59.1 57.2     
Securities  to  Assets  10.4 11.9 10.3 12.1 5.5  8.3  13.5 18.5 
Deposits  to  Liabilities  69.4 78.9 81.9 82.8 93.1 86.3 73.6 70.5 
Liquidity  8.8 9.4 9.7 10.7  4.0 7.1 11.7  19.5 
Capitalization  14.8 13.6 12.2 13.6 5.9  10.5 15.0 21.9 
 
Participation of Total Loans (percent) 
Commercial  82.5 70.5 40.9 49.7 26.5 44.8 71.6 73.0 
Consumer  17.5 28.9 19.7 14.6 5.7  22.4 28.1 23.7 
Mortgage  0.0  0.6  39.4 35.7 67.8 32.8 0.3  3.3 
 
In millions of Colombian pesos of Nov 2005         In millions of US dollars of Nov 2005 
Total Assets of the system  94,962,893        Total Assets of the system    53,207  
Total Loans of the system  62,216,689        Total Loans of the system    34,859 
Total Securities of the system  10,956,440    Total  Securities of the system   6,139 
Total Deposits of the system  65,782,971        Total Deposits of the system    36,858 
 
Total Number of Commercial Banks  40 